Macri's government started with an
unprecedented pressing by the Executive Branch: it is
the first government since 1983 that has not convened the customary special
sessions at the National Assembly. Lacking a majority in both chambers of parliament,
he took the decision to impose a winner-takes-all logic.
By abolishing taxes on food exports, he quickly paid his allies for their support with a sharp
reallocation of income to the agribusiness sector. As expected, this has caused a massive and uncontrolled price rise in the country’s supermarkets. The other radical measure
is the deregulation of imports, by which he has
paid its coalition of transnational corporation CEOs faster
than - even they - expected.
On the other hand, Macri has done little to fulfill his campaign promises to another sector that supported
him: the middle classes who were looking for change. The only measure taken has
been the opening of the currency market, but it has come with a massive devaluation. This will undoubtedly generate a higher concentration
of the economy in the agribusiness
and the transnational corporate and
exporting sectors, for which there are no limits in currency transactions.
Moreover, one of the stronger promises made
during Macri’s campaign was the scrapping
of the income tax on wages. But it has
not been removed and it is gradually
being left out of the
government's agenda. The unions are
already fighting for a mere
compensatory bonus, which is a very
limited measure compared to the previous
fight for the right not to be
double-taxed. If unions do not react promptly
and change strategy, the
situation will substantially worsen for the working
population.
The alliance for the adjustment
Macri’s strategy to implement an unpopular adjustment is based on a
tripartite agreement: legal consent, a gag on information and repression. The
control strategy of the Judiciary is the most controversial of all the crucial
decisions Macri has made so far. The appointment of two Supreme Court judges
with a barely legal procedure which has only been used previously during the
nineteenth-century oligarchic system and twice by the military dictatorship has
prompted rebuff from the Unión Cívica
Radical (Radical Civic Union – UCR), all the opposition parties and even the
Supreme Court itself. The control of the Supreme Court is crucial because it
would allow Macri to skip Congress through permanent vetoes and avoid the
Judiciary’s interference with his advance on the Legislative Branch. The
control of the Judiciary has carried on with two new decrees by Macri that
hinder the implementation of the Criminal Procedure Code and disempower the
Attorney General's Office. Macri will most probably come up with further
reforms by decree during the summer.
Second in this strategy, the gag on information,
began with the accession of several high-ranking Clarín and La Nación managers to government posts. This move is to be completed with the annulment
of the Broadcasting Act, which
has been praised by the United Nations and the Organization of American States as a global example for freedom
of expression and pluralism.
In order to abolish it, Macri decreed the intervention of the Agency
for the Control of the Audiovisual
Communication Services and its
equivalent for the Internet, thus violating the autonomy of these entities
and virtually liquidating the effective
implementation of the law. This is
intended to ensure that market domination by both
communication groups will not be threatened and also
to ensure their access to the State, which is something
that was previously denied them.
The third leg of this strategy is the most classic of all. The handbook
for all the adjustments includes strong repression. Nobody ever passively accepts
getting poorer, so it must be imposed by force. The Cambiemos alliance knows this perfectly well from experience, for many
of its members were also members of Fernando De la Rúa’s government. So much so,
that Macri quickly sent in the police to the always difficult Northern
provinces. The move went quite wrong and produced the first 43 victims of Macrismo. But this did not stop the
Minister of Security, Patricia Bullrich, who declared a state of emergency so
as to give added means to the security forces - and repression, consequently, arrived
quickly for workers at the Cresta Roja poultry company. These emergency
security measures are being approved by most governors because they know full
well that the sub-national authorities are the first victims of any uprising
against adjustment policies.
Democratorship
This mix of fast decisions has to do with Macri’s attempt to
impose a reduction cycle of social and civic rights leading
to a democradura (democratorship),
a sort of low-intensity democracy functioning
in a non-republican way. This reduction of the social role of the State - which the
country has already experienced in the
past - combined with a violation
of the democratic procedures of the Republic is an explosive recipe for a young democracy like Argentina.
How
is it possible, then, that a president who just won
by 680,000 votes is now imposing adjustment policies? The problem comes from
presidentialism – a system that puts the president in the position of a total
winner even if he is not. Macri has no legitimacy to impose structural
adjustments because he won by a very narrow margin and did not reach a majority
in either House of Congress. This demeanor is encouraged by an autocratic style
of government that is characteristic of governors and that Macri was quick to reproduce
as governor of Buenos Aires and is now trying to do the same at national level.
Macri presents himself, and so does a part of the local and international press,
as a modern liberal politician, a pro-market democrat with a social conscience,
a business and family man who understands his role as statesman. This, however,
is only the façade: he is, really, a socially conservative and rightwing neoliberal
who says what people want to hear while he gradually leads us to a democratorship.
The solution would have been different in a parliamentary system. Macri
would have been leading the largest minority in a coalition with Kirchnerism, and he
would have had to negotiate a joint
government or call elections again
after a year of transitional government. This would
have been much more representative of the election results.
Organizing social resilience
The difference between contemporary Argentina and that of the past is
that Argentines have an experience of over 12 years of a center-left government
that massively included popular and middle-class sectors, previously excluded
during the Washington Consensus period. This important part of society is now
very active and politicized and it is certainly resisting many of Macri’s
changes aimed at establishing a democratorship. A first expression of its
strength was to be seen the day before Macri’s inauguration, when hundreds of
thousands filled the Plaza de Mayo in Buenos Aires on the last day of Cristina
Fernández de Kirchner’s mandate. The very same people organized the first
protest against the adjustment and in defence of the freedom of expression on
December, 14. And it was them again who assembled in Plaza Congreso on
December, 17, to reject the adjustment, oppose the appointments by decree to
the Supreme Court, and to voice their disapproval of Macri’s attempt to cancel
the Broadcasting Act. Popular resistance led to the January, 6, massive march
to demand the opening of Congress in January, which showed a high level of
coordination with the Kirchnerista benches and received large media attention,
as well as that of Macri’s government.
It became clear in those fleeting days that the small margin
with which Macri won did not mean a changing of the cycle, but the sharp imposition
of a new era. The story
has not been written yet and the coming period will be characterized by the legislative and union battles,
as well as the cultural and territorial
ones. Social resilience - i.e., the ability of the population to rally and defend its acquired
rights before the aggression which
we are undergoing - is key to avoiding
the possibility of living in a more
unjust society.
It will be crucial for organized actors to uphold the depth of the cultural incorporation - as “rights” and not “aid” - of the changes
produced by the inclusive policies
of the previous presidencies. We should not trust that this will happen naturally, for the government
has already started the battle in these fields. Organized resilience on
the part of society may alone put a
brake on a new attempt by the Right to undermine the democratic State and to commodify social
relations.